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This thesis analyzes the implications of Chinese navy
modernization for the South China Sea. The PRC is
modernizing and expanding its naval capacities for the
purpose of protecting China’s security, territorial, and
economic interests. The PRC has placed a great deal of
emphasis on modernizing its navy since the early 1990’s.
Specifically, Beijing has been purchasing Russian
conventional naval arms designed to defeat and counter U.S.
naval forces in the region. The transformation of China’s
navy from a coastal defense force to a blue water fleet
capable of projecting force at sea will have serious
economic, political, and security implications for the
United States, as well as for those countries bordering
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This thesis examines China’s naval modernization and
its impact for the South China Sea. I contend that the
People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s (PLAN) transformation from
a coastal defense force to a blue water fleet capable of
projecting power at sea will have serious security
implications for the United States and its allies and
friends bordering the South China Sea.
The PRC is modernizing and expanding the PLAN for the
stated purpose of protecting China’s security, territorial
integrity, and economic interests in the region and beyond.
Beijing’s concern about China’s dependence on oil and
natural gas from the Middle East, actual and projected
growth in the PRC’s economy, and the potential oil and gas
reserves in the South China Sea are critical factors
driving PLAN expansion. Competing territorial claims for
island groups and potential oil, gas, and mineral rights
further motivate the PRC’s claim that the South China Sea
inherently belongs to China. 
China’s increasing naval power has the potential to
upset the military balance of power in the Asia-Pacific and
poses a significant threat to U.S. presence as well as to
those countries bordering China and the South China Sea.
The PRC has placed a great deal of emphasis on modernizing
the PLAN since the early 1990s, specifically purchasing
Russian conventional naval arms that were designed to
defeat and counter U.S. naval platforms. China’s motivation
to purchase these platforms indicates its desire to protect
and maintain its maritime interests.
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This thesis analyzes the PLAN’s inventory of sea
denial platforms and its potential impact in the South
China Sea. A future PLAN capable of successfully carrying-
out a sea denial strategy would enable China to maintain a
formidable presence in the South China Sea. As PLAN
capabilities increase, its strength will directly enhance
China’s ability to enforce its interests and eventually
alter the balance of power in the region. The United States
needs to continue peaceful diplomatic approaches to China
on issues of territoriality, sovereignty, and trade in the
South China Sea. In addition, the United States should
contemplate supporting cooperative ventures between the
American and Chinese navies, while continuing to maintain a
viable naval presence in the Asia-Pacific to counter
China’s growing naval presence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines China’s naval modernization and
its impact for the South China Sea. The main argument is
that the People’s Liberation Army-Navy’s (PLAN)
transformation from a coastal defense force to a blue water
fleet capable of projecting People’s Republic of China
(PRC) doctrine at sea will have serious security
implications for the United States and allies bordering the
South China Sea. The thesis is based on primary and
secondary open sources addressing PRC interests in the
South China Sea, trends in PLAN modernization and strategy,
and their significance for future PRC actions in the South
China Sea maritime theater of operation. The research for
this thesis comes from interviews, periodicals, books,
Internet websites, official journals, and reports.

A. BACKGROUND
After reviewing countless articles concerning the
PLAN’s build up, it became apparent that China will not
meet its goal of having a blue water fleet capable of
successful power projection across the South China Sea
within the next 15-20 years. China’s present course of
acquiring naval arms and efforts to modernize its South Sea
fleet will not support a blue water scenario. What the
current PLAN modernization does in fact support is the
continuance of a coastal defense force with an increasing
offensive capability that could potentially be used to deny
access of South China Sea - Sea Lines of Communication
(SLOC’s), chokepoints, and secure PRC vital interests.
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These vital interests include security, territorial,
political, and economic issues.  
The PLAN is acquiring a host of sea-denial platforms
that can be used against future rivals in the South China
Sea for the protection of China’s perceived interests to be
discussed later. The PLAN’s future ability to successfully
conduct a sea-denial strategy in the South China Sea poses
the most likely scenario given China’s present path towards
naval modernization. The use of China’s present inventory
in this fashion will have a dramatic impact upon regional
security for the U.S. and countries bordering the South
China Sea. A modernized PLAN has the potential of altering
the balance of power in the region.

B. ORGANIZATION
This thesis briefly examines the evolution of the PLAN
from a small coastal defense force into the third largest
navy on the planet. An in-depth analysis of past and
current PLAN modernization, naval doctrine, and strategy
gives insight into the political and technological
challenges confronting China’s navy. The thesis discusses
PRC maritime interests in the South China Sea. China looks
to the South China Sea as an area of Chinese exclusivity.
The competing territorial claims, sovereignty and resource
issues by neighboring countries continue to undermine PRC
claims that the South China Sea inherently belongs to
China. Hostility has grown among Chinese over the
competition for South China Sea’s resources. The PRC is
greatly concerned about its growing energy demands and
looks to the South China Sea to potentially solve its
future fate, as well as a focal point of national security.
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In lieu of China’s recent signing of the ASEAN supported
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, past efforts to resolve conflicting interests with
China over South China Sea issues have been met with
resistance, both politically and militarily.1 This is a
major concern for the United States in the future since its
Asian allies are heavily reliant upon the South China Sea
for its commercial livelihood and resources.
The current capabilities of the PLAN cannot be
considered as a backward maritime threat that will pose no
significant challenge to the U.S. in the early 21st century.
During the past ten years China has steadily equipped its
naval inventory with large amounts of conventional arms and
naval platforms that are considered to be extremely
effective. These acquisitions include Kilo-class
submarines, Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, and
various other armaments of Russian origin designed to
counter and defeat U.S. naval weapons and platforms.
Together, they pose a commanding presence in the South
China Sea and a viable threat to future access and
stability in the South China Sea.

C. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II briefly examines China’s storied maritime
tradition and the evolution of the PLAN. In this chapter I
contend that China places great importance and need in
having a modernized navy to meet its potential 21st century
threats.    
                    
1 “China, ASEAN Sign Code of Conduct on South China Sea.” People’s
Daily (November 5, 2002): Available online
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/05/eng20021105_106254.shtml>
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Chapter III addresses many of China’s interests in and
around the South China Sea, focusing on the relative
importance of each in respect to China’s future security
and economic prosperity.
Chapter IV focuses on the PLAN’s foreign arms
acquisitions, current capabilities, and their collective
potential use as sea-denial platforms. 
In summation, Chapter V offers an assessment of how
the threat of a modernized PLAN will threaten the military





A. CHINESE NAVAL AND MARITIME TRADITION
China has a storied and often inconsistent maritime
tradition of rising to dominance during some periods and
fading into relative obscurity during others. China’s naval
roots can be traced back to its earliest recorded battle in
549 BC when rival rulers used ships to assault each other’s
seacoast.2 The Chinese were once the masters of the high
seas. During the Song dynasty (AD 960-1279) Chinese fleet’s
numbered upwards of 13,000 ships and their presence
stretched across Asia into Northern Australia and Western
Africa.3 Much like the present PLAN, China’s dynastic navies
performed similar roles in settling territorial disputes,
issues of sovereignty, deterrence, national security, and
protecting interests.
China’s naval dominance reached its peak during the
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), when Chinese shipbuilding,
maritime trade, and navigation ability were superior to
many of the European maritime countries. The Chinese
developed and mastered the art of multi-masted sails,
compartmentalization, and large hull construction. Their
ships were greater in size and design than those found in
Europe. The Chinese ships reached lengths over 500 feet and
displaced up to 1500 tons during the Ming dynasty. Towards
the latter part of the Ming dynasty, a political power
struggle occurred between two factions of the Chinese court
                    
2 Cole, Bernard D. The Great Wall at Sea. (Annapolis: MD Naval
Institute Press, 2001), 2.
3 Gang, Deng. Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic
Development, c.2100BC-1900AD. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1997), 41.
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over different theories of the commercial and technology
benefits of foreign trade against the benefits of
isolationism.4 Subsequently, China ended its sea trade and
relegated its navy to a brown water defense force by
shifting its national economic strategy towards
isolationism. This decision eroded China’s sea power and
nautical advantages over its Western rivals. China’s
security strategy shifted almost entirely onto the
shoulders of its army and this has remained the primary
branch of service in China ever since. 
The Chinese made several attempts during the Qing
dynasty (1644-1912) to restore its navy. These efforts to
modernize its navy were provoked by challenges from the
Western great powers in the late 19th century, following
years of political infighting among Confucian
traditionalists and pro-modernization reformers. The
Chinese deployed a modern navy led by Li Hongzhang, in
1884.5 However, Li was unable to build the navy into an
effective fighting force. The Chinese were defeated in a
series of naval engagements with the French and Japanese.
Following the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Republican
China (1912-1949) did not make any significant attempts to
rebuild the Chinese navy. The navy fell once again into
disarray and became an insignificant and obsolete service.

B. PLAN 1949-78
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was founded in 1927
and evolved from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strong
                    
4 Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human
Societies. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 412.
5 Cole, 1-3.
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arm to a national force. Its original purpose was to seize
power, stabilize order, and maintain the party line. When
the communists seized power in 1949, the role of the PLA
shifted to homeland defense. The PLA split into three
service branches, PLA, PLAAF (Air Force), and PLAN. The
PLAN was established on 23 April 1949, originally
consisting of less than a hundred obsolete ships and a few
thousand seamen. They consisted mainly of defecting
Kuomintang sailors, PLA guerrillas, and fisherman.6 The need
for a stronger navy was predicated on several maritime
threats. The Nationalists occupied Taiwan and many offshore
islands, and they controlled the mainland sea-lanes from
Shanghai on southward. The U.S. Navy, together with other
Asian neighbors, had the potential to mount an amphibious
counterattack against the mainland.7 The PLAN remained
relegated to the role of a coastal defense force for the
next three decades until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.
At the conclusion of the Korean War (1950-53),
Chairman Mao outlined his three major assignments for the
PLAN: “wipe out the Nationalists in the coastal areas;
assist the army in taking over Taiwan; and resist an
imperialist invasion from the sea.”8 Mao was a staunch
continentalist, and he saw the navy as an expendable, but
useful, force. This was a role the navy performed with
moderate success in the mid 1950s following China’s assault
on the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands. This forced
                    
6 Cole, 4-5.
7 Swanson, Bruce. Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s
Quest for Seapower. (Annapolis: MD Naval Institute Press, 1982), 184-
185.
8 Kondapalli, Srikanth. “China’s Naval Strategy,” Foreign Affairs,
(March 3, 2000): 2. Available online
<http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3945d5de7976.html>
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the withdrawal of the Nationalist troops from the Tachen
Islands and the seizure of the island of Ichiang. “The navy
reflected a willingness to adopt Western-style tactics and
employ proven assault techniques and equipment.”9 The
training and resources that enabled the PLAN’s success
originated from the Soviet Union.

1. Soviet Assistance 
The coastal defense of the mainland formed the
strategic guidance for PLAN operations and development in
what came to be known as the “Great Wall at sea.”10 During
the 1950s the Soviets began transferring extensive amounts
of arms to China in support of the Korean War.11 This was
followed by an increasing flow of technology, material, and
training to help build China’s defense industrial base and
increase its military effectiveness. With the aid of the
Soviets, the Chinese began to increase their naval
inventory with many Soviet designed naval platforms, such
as the Gordy-class destroyer, Kronstadt-class submarine
chaser, torpedo boats, T 43 minesweeper, and the W-class
submarine.12 
Soviet support spearheaded the PLAN’s establishment of
its Academy of Military Sciences and many other PRC naval
schools fashioned along Soviet lines. Soviet naval
regulations, tactics, and training procedures were adopted
into the PRC’s infant naval program. Bruce Swanson writes
                    
9 Swanson, 191.
10 Cole, 10-15.




in Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest
for Sea power that “by 1956 PRC naval schools had expanded…
training was becoming much more professional…students were
reading translated versions of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History.13 The PLAN was rapidly developing, but
this new development was not without its antagonists within
the CCP. China’s traditionalists continued to be at odds
with the PLAN’s efforts to become a modern and professional
navy, sparking many ideological versus technological
debates over the adoption of foreign and modern military
technologies, strategy, and weapons systems. The
traditionalists never saw the importance of naval sea
power. In 1960, the Soviets cut off its military assistance
to China, and without the continued support of PRC
leadership, effective PLAN modernization ceased.14 China’s
naval doctrine and modernization became pragmatic and
directed by the constant pressures of the international
environment.

2. People’s War 
China’s overall military combat effectiveness and
ability to conduct modern warfare diminished partially
because of its reliance on Soviet assistance, but mostly
due to the lasting effects of Mao Zedong’s “people’s war”
doctrine and strategy. The PRC military prepared itself by
figuring out ways to win a war with inferior equipment
against a military with superior equipment.15 The “people’s
                    
13 Ibid., 199.
14 Ibid., 215.
15 Liqun, Deng. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Vol. I.
(Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994), 582-583.
  10
war” focused on countering a Soviet invasion using an
attrition strategy using the mainland as the operating
theater. The Cultural Revolution (1966-76) continued to
increase the gap between PRC and Western military
capabilities. During Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the
military became little more than a political tool of the
party. The PRC’s defense industry suffered extensively
during this period and was not considered to be modern by
Western standards. China’s post-Sino-Soviet split navy
declined into an ill-equipped, poorly trained, and under-
funded coastal defense force. The PLAN, as was the case
with the other service branches, was forced to defend
China’s borders with circa 1950 Soviet equipment and
technology against superior Western armaments. Several
attempts by the PLAN to compensate for its lack of
modernization by incorporating modern operational concepts




In 1978, two years after the death of Mao, Deng
Xiaoping ascended to power. Deng immediately criticized
China’s ability to fight a modern war. The PLA forces had
relatively minimal access to modern military technology.
Deng addressed his vision of a modern China at the 9th
National Congress of Chinese Trade Unions in his “four
modernizations” speech that called for, among other things,
                    
16 Godwin, Paul H.B. PLA Faces the Twenty-First Century. (American
Enterprise Institute, 1999), 40-42.
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a modern national defense.17 Shortly thereafter, the PLAN
embarked on the first of its modernization efforts to
improve technology, doctrine, operations, and training.
Deng’s ambitions for a modernized China set the wheels in
motion for an evolution in PRC military doctrine and
strategy.  By 1985 Deng’s military reforms manifested an
actual change in doctrine from the late 1970s concept of
“people’s war under modern conditions” to “limited war.”18
The new doctrine focused on local and limited wars of short
duration, with special importance placed upon contested
border territories, territorial seas and islands, limited
attacks upon Chinese territory, and Chinese
counterattacks.19 A national defense strategy followed,
setting new contingencies for PRC defense from a
continental to peripheral defense strategy that would place
China’s maritime territories under a protective umbrella.
This prescribed new roles and missions on PLAN, PLANAF, and
PLAAF branches that were either insignificant to, or were
focused entirely on, the previous continental strategy. The
PLAN regained its relative importance to national security,
and the replacement and acquisition of new platforms,
weaponry, and systems were imperative for the PLAN to take




                    
17 Xiaoping, Deng. Speech at the 9TH National Congress of Chinese
Trade Unions. (October 11, 1978). Available online
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1250.html>
18 Godwin, Paul H.B. “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine,





Admiral Liu Huaqing is credited with having the single
greatest impact upon current PLAN modernization. As PLAN
commander from 1982 to 1988, Liu laid out the navy’s
mission and future objectives. The PLAN’s missions were
“designated as safeguarding China’s territorial integrity;
being prepared for a potential requirement to blockade
Taiwan; preventing a sea-based invasion of China; and over
the long term, building a survivable sea-based nuclear
retaliatory force.”20 The navy also changed its strategy
from coastal defense to offshore defense and future blue-
water power projection.21 The offshore defense strategy
called for development in three phases: 1) By 2000, the
PLAN will “train and enhance existing formations,
renovation, and improvement of the conventional naval
vessels; 2) from 2001 to 2020, it will “concentrate on the
construction of several light carriers…purchase warships to
supplement the carrier task force…and bolster offshore
combat capability”; 3) and from 2021 to 2040, it will
transform the PLAN into a major blue-water navy.22 

2. Re-Equipping the Navy
In the 1990s China returned to the Russians for
military arms and technology. In 1989 Sino-Soviet relations
were normalized, and the PLA began to procure weapons and
equipment that began to improve its overall military
                    
20 Ibid., 469.
21 Kondapalli, 3.
22 Dowling, John. “China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy: Part I:
Restructuring Begins.” Jane’s Intelligence Review v.8, 3 (1996): 129-
133.
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effectiveness. The arms acquisitions began at a critical
time, following a Western embargo on arms and technology to
China in response of the Tiananmen incident. Later, in
1991, the fall of the Soviet Union had a dramatic affect on
the PRC’s threat perception, once again shifting from the
Soviet threat to the United States and Taiwan.23 The
successful United States participation in the Gulf War
against Iraq significantly affected China’s security
context. These events re-affirmed PLAN modernization in
support of its peripheral defense strategy and heightened
PRC anticipation of a future conflict along its
southeastern flank, namely the South China Sea. 
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III.PRC’S SOUTH CHINA SEA INTERESTS
A. POLITICAL INTERESTS
1. Regional Security
The South China Sea remains an area of extreme
importance for China’s regional security.24 The Chinese lay
claim to practically the entire South China Sea. China’s
maritime claims in the South China Sea are a source of
dissension among China’s neighbors who have competing
claims against the PRC’s.25 The PRC has displayed its
resolve to use military force in the past in support of its
territorial claims and issues of sovereignty in the South
China Sea. China’s navy in the past and foreseeable future
will remain Beijing’s call to action force in the South
China Sea. China’s present naval modernization implies that
the PRC is anticipating future military actions over issues
regarding the South China Sea. 
In the reaction to China’s naval modernization, there
is a growing feeling among countries residing in South-east
Asia that in the long term the United States cannot be
relied upon as a guarantor of regional stability and that
without its presence, states will be less restrained in
asserting themselves and enforcing their territorial and
maritime claims.26 The South China Sea is the area in the
Asia-Pacific that poses the greatest concern because of the
PRC’s growing navy, competing maritime claims, territorial
                    
24 See Appendix A.
25 Valencia, M.J., Van Dyke, J.M., Ludwig, N.A. Sharing the
Resources of the South China Sea. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1999), 5-8.
26 Valencia, Mark J. China and the South China Sea Disputes. (Great
Britain: Halston and Co. Ltd., 1995), 3.
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disputes, and location in proximity to China’s borders. The
PRC continues to remain opaque concerning its future
intentions in the South China Sea. “Actions by the PRC to
defend offshore claims in the South China Sea have been
held up as a test case of the PRC’s readiness to be a
responsible member of the international community.”27  

2. Territoriality
The PRC is not the only country proclaiming that
national interests are at stake in the South China Sea.
There is growing competition among rival claimants for
territory and resources in the South China Sea.28
Consequently, the PRC is involved in territorial disputes
with Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei,
and Indonesia over the scattered islands and reefs located
within the South China Sea.29 To an outside observer, these
disputes may appear petty on the surface. Many of the
disputed territories are nothing more than exposed reefs
and tiny islands of seemingly little use to a country’s
national interests. For most claimants in the dispute, and
the PRC in particular, the area above the water is of less
value than the potential resources under the water. The
PRC’s interests lay in exploiting the South China Sea
seabed’s large reserves of natural gas and oil deposits.30 
                    
27 Snyder, Scott. “The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for
Preventive Diplomacy.” Special Report of the United States Institute
for Peace (Washington, D.C., August, 1996), 7.
28 See Appendix B.
29 Ball, Desmond “Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region.”
International Security 18, 3, Winter 1993-94, 88-89.
30 Valencia, 111.
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Among China’s territorial disputes with Taiwan over
the Paracel and Spratly Islands is the 53-year conflict
regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan. These disputed
territorial and sovereignty issues could potentially
trigger a military conflict in the South China Sea. PLAN
modernization would have a tremendous impact on China’s
ability to effectively project power in the South China
Sea. Without the continued presence of the United States in
the region, and the possible exception of Taiwan, no other
claimant possesses a navy strong enough to effectively
defend itself against a PLAN offensive in the Spratly or
Paracel Islands.  

3. Competing Claims 
China has a number of competing territorial claims in
the South China Sea. The rationales for China’s disputes
vary from claims based on territorial jurisdiction,
historical legacy, and geopolitics. In 1992, the PRC
provided itself legal justification to support its actions
to assert sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and other
contiguous zones within the South China Sea by passing its
Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. The law of
the sea claims include: continental shelf claims,
settlement disputes, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims,
fishing zone claims, territorial sea, baseline, and
historic waters claims. These laws give the PRC a greater
basis for claiming control over the Spratlys as a
contiguous zone for territory.31 Control over the Spratly
Islands are one of four areas in the South China Sea that
                    
31 Austin, Greg China’s Ocean Frontier. (Canberra: Allen and Unwin
Australia Pty Ltd., 1998), 4, 42, 44, 48-52, 57-58.
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China perceives as sensitive and are heavily disputed. The
others are the northern Natuna Islands, Gulf of Tonkin,
Taiwan, and the Paracel Islands. In 1996 China claimed
these islands based on United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). These islands lay within the UNCLOS
definition of an EEZ and according to Beijing, are
inherently China’s. 
The Gulf of Tonkin boundary with Vietnam is based on
an 1887 Sino-French treaty, in which the PRC insists the
boundary lines were determined by an imperialist colonial
power and therefore should not be the basis of settlement.
In 1974 the PRC used military force to take the Paracel
Islands from the Republic of South Vietnam. The governments
of Vietnam and Taiwan dispute the PRC’s possession of the
Parcels. Finally, the Spratly Islands are contested by six
claimants which include the PRC, Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. What makes the Spratly
dispute difficult is that the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam lay
claim to the entire island chain, and the other claimants
desire only sections of the archipelago that reside closest
to their borders. 
There have been several attempts to resolve these
competing claims. Among the most recent was a quasi-
diplomatic conference that occurred in 1994 at Bukittinggi,
Indonesia. This was the fifth in a series designed to
explore the sensitive issues of conflict in the South China
Sea. In summary, the Bukittinggi talks ended with Taiwan
and China blocking an agreement on non-military expansion
in the South China Sea. With the exception of the
Philippines, the claimants unanimously rejected halting
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further military expansion. “Despite all hope of
improvement, the most likely scenario for the future of the
South China Sea disputes is the status quo.”32 

4. Spratly Islands
The threat of a burgeoning great power seeking to
acquire increasing amounts of territory is alarming and
unfathomable in any other region besides the Asia-Pacific.
For China’s neighbors in the South China Sea, the threat is
real and appears to be growing everyday. Many Asia-Pacific
analysts have expressed apprehension about China’s
assertiveness in the South China Sea. Mr. G. O’Leary, an
expert in Asia-Pacific regional politics writes in The
Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy, that the Spratlys are
considered to be “highly vulnerable in the wake of Chinese
military power and considers this area to be “the most
dangerous in the South China Sea.”33 The Spratlys have
become increasingly militarized over the past decade.34 The
majority of the claimants have garrisoned troops, aircraft
runways, and helicopter pads over the years to conduct
military activities.35 
Justifications for these complex and competing claims
are not absent of violent military action. For example, a
confrontation occurred in 1988, over the occupation of
Fiery Cross Reef between Vietnamese and Chinese troops that
                    
32 Valencia, 50-57.
33 O’Leary, G. The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy. (Canberra:
Australia National University Press, 1980), 7-9.
34 See Appendix C.
35 See Appendix C.
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left seventy-four Vietnamese missing and seven killed.36 The
Chinese are continually improving their ability to back up
their claims in the Spratly’s. The discovery in 1995 on
Mischief Reef of hardened concrete facilities directly
contradicts Beijing’s “soothing nostrums of cooperation and
consultation.”37 China is enhancing its capability to
project force in the region. As long as the PRC continues
its expansive claims, threatens to use this force, and
refuses multilateral initiatives, Washington should view
Beijing’s actions as a precursor to a scarcely hidden
agenda of dominating the South China Sea. 
 
5.  Sovereignty
China’s use of military force to resolve its issue of
sovereignty with Taiwan would certainly prompt U.S.
intervention, the United States formally recognizes Taiwan
as a province of the PRC and accepts the mainland’s “two-
systems, one China” policy.38 The U.S. desires a peaceful
resolution to the unification issue, U.S.-Taiwan Security
Relations Act of 1979 does not formally commit U.S. forces
to Taiwan’s defense, but the U.S. reserves the right to
intervene. 
In 1949 the CCP forced the retreat of nearly 2 million
Chinese nationalists to the offshore island of Taiwan. The
Republic of China (ROC) government was established on
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37 McDevitt, Michael. “China and the South China Sea—A Conference
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Taiwan but continued to take China’s 1947 constitution as
extending to all of China, resulting in both governments
claiming legitimacy as the rightful government of China.
Since 1949 both the ROC and PRC governments have been
uniformly hostile to each other. Each side has maintained
no official direct dialogue with the other.39 Throughout
this period, Taiwan has democratized and developed into one
of East Asia’s economic powers. Even though Taiwan has
acted autonomously from the communist mainland for the past
fifty years, the PRC still desires to reunify Taiwan with
the Mainland. The issue of unification is a sensitive topic
for both sides. Taiwan remains leery of PRC intentions
since “…China has historically employed naval force over
issues of sovereignty – about national control of specific
islands or provinces.”40 In the case of Taiwan, as recent
as 1995-1996, China made an attempt to intimidate Taiwan by
conducting a missile firing exercise in the Taiwan Straits.
China’s objective was to deter Taiwan from declaring its
future independence and to encourage reunification by
threatening the use of military force. This prompted the
U.S. Seventh Fleet to intervene on behalf of Taiwan and
deter potential PRC acts of aggression.41 
The threat of a mainland China invasion upon Taiwan
continues to be a sensitive topic for everyone concerned.
However one looks at it, Chinese military intervention over
the affair would be a no-win situation. A military solution
would likely incur U.S. military intervention,
                    
39 Mastel, 46.
40 Cole, 28.




international backlash, and loss of its prosperous
Taiwanese trade. So far, the PRC has only threatened the
use of force. If Taiwan does formally declare independence,
Beijing has repeatedly stated that it will have no




The PRC has experienced tremendous growth in the past
two decades. This economic growth has encouraged further
interest in the South China Sea as a vital link to
increased prosperity. In 1978, the PRC embarked upon a
major program of economic reform. The Chinese government
loosened restrictions on state control over some prices,
“…encouraged the formation of rural enterprises and private
businesses, liberalized foreign trade and investment, …and
invested in industrial production and the education of its
workforce.”42 These reforms enabled China to channel a
significant portion of its traditional agriculture labor
force into rural-based manufacturing plants, resulting in
increased national productivity, economic returns, and
foreign investment.43 In addition, China’s economic
liberalization has increased exports, and China leads the
Asian region in terms of growth in merchandise imports and
exports over the past decade.44 
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Although there are many people who believe China’s
growth is exaggerated, the PRC officially reports a GDP
annual average of 9.4 percent between 1978 and 2001.45
Judging from economic analyses of Asia’s overall growth in
the past decade, the entire Asia-Pacific will continue to
grow and compete for the same markets and resources.46
China’s interest in the South China Sea will expand due to
the PRC’s desire to continue its overall growth. The
uninterrupted flow of maritime trade and Middle Eastern oil
through the South China Sea will be imperative to China’s
economic future. 

2. Energy Demands 
As China’s energy demands increase and China continues
its transition from coal to cleaner burning oil, China’s
reliance upon Middle East oil and the search for
alternative petroleum sources will increase. In 1993, China
became a net oil importer for the first time in its
history. In 1999, the PRC imported 40 million tons of oil
and reached over 60 million tons in year 2000. China’s
demand for oil imports is expected to make-up 40 percent of
the PRC total consumption by 2010.47 By that time, China
will most likely become the second largest oil consumer in
the world, behind only the United States. The majority of
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this increase will be consumed by its growing
transportation sector.48
There is a growing belief among Asian states that the
PRC believes the South China Sea may hold the key to many
of its future energy needs. Surveys of the sea floor have
revealed deposits of oil and natural gas off China’s coast.
The question is how much? China believes there are large
deposits of oil and natural gas. Some believe this may be
at the source of the PRC’s many claims in the South China
Sea.49 These discoveries in the already disputed areas of
the South China Sea have the potential to be extremely
disruptive to regional security and prompt an arms race
over the matter. In light of China’s present naval
modernization, the race may have already begun.

C. SECURITY INTERESTS
1. Sea Lines of Communication
The free flow of commercial shipping through the South
China Sea is of vital importance to all in the East Asia
region.50 In addition to China, these countries rely upon
the steady free flow of maritime transport through the
South China Sea to support their populations. Open SLOCs
are imperative to further global trade, and are vital to
linking the economies of the world. For China, its
increased maritime activity and growing energy requirements
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has resulted in increased reliance on the SLOCs.51 In the
event the SLOCs are threatened, it is possible that China
would intervene to defend what it perceives as a vital
national interest.52 In 1996, China threatened the SLOCs in
the Strait’s of Taiwan by conducting missile test firings.
It was not the PRC’s intention to close the Strait’s to
maritime shipping, but that is exactly what resulted.
Merchant vessels were deterred from transiting the Strait’s




The SLOCs present a strategic element to PRC claims in
the South China Sea. The PRC could use its navy potentially
to obstruct the freedom of navigation in the sea. The
threat of force by PLAN missiles, mines, and torpedoes
would shut down SLOC traffic and disrupt international
shipping through the South China Sea. The impeding of safe
passage of the SLOCs or their closure would certainly
affect regional economic interests. The implications of
these actions would significantly affect shipping rates and
therefore the costs of imports and exports. Such acts of
provocation would most likely incite a military response
from the United States.53 As outlined in President Bush’s
most recent National Security Strategy of the United States
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of America, released in September 2002, among U.S. goals
for its international strategy is to “ignite a new era of
global economic growth through free markets and free
trade.”54 Washington is committed to defeating those threats
to the peace and prosperity of our allies and friends.

3. Geo Strategic
The South China Sea is an important piece in the geo
political puzzle China presents. The SLOCs are increasingly
important to the PRC as its international imports and
exports increase. As well, the PRC has become more and more
reliant on Middle Eastern oil exports. The PRC’s
garrisoning of troops on the Paracel and Spratly Islands,
PLAN modernization, and past military aggressions indicate
China’s deep commitment to enforcing its territorial claims
through the use of military force.55 Since the defense of
this entire body of water is beyond the PRC’s current
capabilities, a blue water capable navy would be required,
at the very least, to protect all of China’s perceived
interests in the South China Sea. 
Based upon the current and projected PLAN
modernization efforts, a blue water navy is not foreseeable
until at least 2020. Therefore the PRC would employ only
its current PLAN inventory in the eventuality its maritime
interests need protecting. The types of naval platforms
that China maintains are capable of carrying-out a sea-
denial strategy of defending SLOCs and chokepoints, but it
is not a fleet on fleet engagement force. This strategy
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appears to be consistent with the PRC’s national maritime
strategy of offshore defense. Many of China’s foreign
acquisitions are indicative of a naval modernization
strategy intended to project power in these areas. 
The PLAN’s South Sea Fleet appears to be poised and
configured to counter and deter potential threats to its
interests in the South China Sea. The South Sea Fleet has
within its inventory a marine infantry brigade and numerous
weapons systems and platforms at its disposal capable of
carrying-out a sea-denial strategy that would pose the
greatest threat to U.S. interests in the South China Sea.56 
The South China Sea is significant to the PRC not only as a
strategic security zone, but also as a region important to
PRC maritime trade, sovereignty, and natural resources.
Consequently, China is modernizing the South Sea Fleet to
bolster its capacity to address its growing maritime
interests within the South China Sea.










                    




































A. OFFSHORE ACTIVE DEFENSE
China’s shift in maritime strategy from a coastal
defense strategy to an offshore defense strategy, coined by
PLAN Admiral Liu Huaqing as “offshore active defense,” has
a great potential impact on the South China Sea. The
ultimate objective of Admiral Liu’s strategy is to control
the seas out to the first and second island chains. The
islands running from the Kuril Islands north of Japan down
through Indonesia, including the South China Sea, represent
the first island chain. An open ocean blue water navy for
China is represented in Liu’s “…second island chain,
delineated by a line from Japan through the Bonin Islands,
the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands.”57 PLAN
modernization complements this new strategy by acquiring
and building naval weapons systems and platforms designed
to successfully conduct operations in these environments. 
The feasibility of the PLAN capability to control the
first island chain by 2020 is highly unlikely. China lacks
the two most important elements to controlling these
waterways -- aircraft carriers and the ability to conduct
sustained battle group operations. China’s investment in
naval platforms capable of deploying mines, missiles, and
torpedoes will eventually enhance its ability to conduct a
sea-denial strategy in the South China Sea. As defined by
Admiral Arthur T. Mahan, sea denial or destroying commerce
provides a means for harrying and tiring an enemy. Although
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sea denial is not a war-winning strategy, it may cause
“great individual injury and discontent” for an enemy.58 
Over the past two decades, a greater emphasis has been
placed on PLAN modernization, resulting in the re-emergence
of China as a regional maritime power. The PLAN has
undertaken great measures to evolve from a quantitatively
inferior navy to a qualitatively superior one. The PLAN
embraces the concept of a hi-tech, mobile, and flexible
fighting force and its naval inventory reflects this shift
in mindset. 

B. FOREIGN NAVAL ACQUISITIONS
The PRC is using foreign naval acquisitions from
Russia to close the gap with Western naval superiority. The
Chinese are purchasing a wide array of affordable Russian-
built naval arms. The PLAN has dramatically increased its
maritime power by acquiring systems, many of which are of
former Soviet design, specifically engineered to defeat and
exploit U.S. naval platforms. Among these purchases are
submarines, destroyers, missiles, and aircraft that
significantly enhance China’s ability to conduct a sea-
denial strategy within the South China Sea. The PRC is
acquiring weapons and technology directly aimed at
deterring and defending against regional adversaries. These
efforts are mostly focused on upgrading subsurface,
surface, and air capabilities. 
China lacks the ability to produce the necessary
advanced equipment and weapons systems required to catch up
                    




with the United States, so it relies on foreign arms
acquisition to close the technology gap. The majority of
these acquisitions come from Russia, but purchases and




The PLAN is using Russian-built and designed
submarines to modernize its sub-surface capabilities. China
received the last of four Kilo-class diesel attack boats
from Russia in 1998. The first two Kilo’s acquired are Type
877EKM’s. These are complemented with a MGK-400 Shark Gill
Low Frequency active/passive sonar suite, MG-519 Mouse Roar
active mine avoidance system, a Strela Surface-to-Air
Missile (SAMs) position, and up to eighteen torpedoes or
sea mines. The third and fourth Kilos purchased, are of the
Type 636 variety. The Type 636 improvements include a
larger weapons payload of four SAMs, and the option of
carrying eighteen torpedoes, surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) or 24 sea mines.60 Russian sources report that China
intends to purchase eight additional Type 636 submarines in
the future.61 The additions of the four Kilo-class
submarines from Russia enhance China’s ability to control
SLOC’s, strategic chokepoints, and serve as a coercive
influence in the South China Sea. 
                    
59 Fisher Jr., Richard “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA
Modernization.” American Enterprise Institute 1999, 85-90.
60 “The Military Balance 1999-2000.” International Institute for
Strategic Studies (Oxford University Press 2001), 187-188.






 Under a 1996 agreement, the PRC purchased two
Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia. The Sovremennys
are equipped with eight supersonic Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn
missiles, one of the most advanced SSMs on the planet. The
Moskit has a maximum speed of Mach 2.1 and a range of
sixty-five nautical miles.62 The Sunburn missiles
characteristics “have been optimized for the specific
purpose of overcoming the defense barrier of the US Navy’s
Aegis system.”63 The destroyers are propelled by steam
turbines and can reach a speed of 32 knots. The greatest
impact the Sovremennys have on PLAN performance are their
abilities as air defense platforms. They are equipped with
48 SA-N-7 Gadfly or SA-N-17 Grizzly semi-active radar-
guidance air defense missiles, with a firing range of 25
kilometers.64 These ships improve the PLAN’s ability to
provide air cover for ground forces and defend against air
attacks. 

3. SUKHOI SU-27 Flanker Fighter Aircraft
Although in service in China’s Air Force (PLAAF), the
PRC purchased 50 Sukhoi SU-27 Flanker fighter aircraft from
Russia. The Sukhoi’s are a fourth generation aircraft,
capable of speeds up to Mach 2.3. What makes the SU-27’s
presence significant in the South China Sea is its extended
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range and firepower. The SU-27 has a range of 4000 km,
which is nearly twice the range of the indigenously
developed Nanchang Q-5 and Chengdu/Guizhou J-7 attack
fighter aircraft in the PLANAF inventory.65 It is outfitted
with a 30 mm gun and up to ten externally mounted rockets,
air-to-surface missiles, and bombs. The PLAN’s use of the
Sukhoi’s increases its air combat, air defense, and strike
capability in the South China Sea.66

C.  PLAN INVENTORY
1. Submarine Forces
The Chinese place great importance on their sub-
surface warfare programs, with five currently in
existence.67 The submarine is the most lethal and coercive
sea-going element to a surface combatant. There is little
defense against a wake-homing torpedo launched by an
undetected submarine. As stated in CRS Report RL 30700: An
attack by a wake-homing torpedo would pose a particular
threat to a U.S. Navy ship for two reasons. First,
torpedoes are difficult to detect because they approach the
ship from the rear, where their sound is masked by the
noise of the ship’s propellers. Second, a wake-homing
torpedo would not be fooled by an acoustic decoy, and the
ship may find it difficult to maneuver quickly enough to
reduce or eliminate its wake.68 
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China’s submarine arsenal consists of indigenous and
Russian made boats. Five nuclear powered attack submarines
head up a force of primarily diesel-powered boats, which
include the modern Russian Kilo and older Romeo classes and
the indigenously built Ming and Song classes. The PRC
possesses 65 submarines in all, including a Xia-class fleet
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) that conducted a
successful missile firing exercise in 1988.69 The SSBN
increases the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent.
According to Jane’s “the underwater environment is a great
leveler when it comes to military sophistication and the
presence of any submarine, however elderly, hugely
complicates the life of a naval commander.”70 The Chinese
have also invested in a number of accessories to help
improve the performance of their submarines. These upgrades
include side-scan sonar, deep-sea cameras, and special




China’s surface force has increased in size and
effectiveness over the past two decades. The PLAN has more
than doubled its number of support ships, increased its
inventory with destroyers and frigates that possess greater
firepower, range, and speed.72 The PRC also embarked on a
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naval shipbuilding program, focusing on developing
destroyers, frigates, coastal patrol craft, and light
amphibious assault ships.73 Among the surface combatants are
two very important additions; the Luhu-class destroyer and
Jiangwei-class frigate, these two projects represent a
significant improvement to the PLAN’s surface inventory.
The larger Luhu-class destroyer surpasses the aging Luda-
class destroyer. The Luhu improves China’s ability to
conduct anti-air and submarine warfare. They are outfitted
with improved sonar suites, Crotale missiles, a helicopter
operations capacity, and eight C-802 surface-to-surface
missiles.74 The Jiangwei-class frigate is the heir apparent
to the older Jianghu-class; Jiangwei’s carry CY-1
torpedoes, C-801 surface-to-surface missiles, HQ-61 SAM’s,
and helicopters.75 
China is neither building nor purchasing the vessels
necessary that indicate near-term plans for a large
amphibious landing or the complete control of the South
China Sea. To achieve these objectives, the PLAN, at the
very least, would need to invest in heavy amphibious
assault ships required to debark a large number of ground
troops and aircraft carriers to maintain blue water
supremacy. The PLAN’s ambition to invest in these
particular platforms potentially reflects the PRC’s
intentions of controlling areas of vital interest rather
than the entire South China Sea.   

                    
73 Yung, Christopher D. “People’s War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in
the Twenty-First Century.” Center for Naval Analyses (Alexandria,






China possesses a large naval air force. Although
sizable, many of the airframes in the PLANAF inventories
are outdated or non-combat capable.76 The Chinese concluded
from the Gulf War that air superiority was crucial to the
U.S. success. Taking a page out of the U.S. playbook, the
Chinese are now emphasizing the importance of strike,
stealth, night vision, long range attacks, intelligence,
and electronic warfare.77 Known and projected foreign
weapons acquisitions are the Integrated Air Defense System
(IADS) known as Phalcon, Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) the Searchwater, SU-27SK Flankers and F-8
interceptor fighters, command and control systems,
precision guided missiles (PGM), and anti-air missiles
(AAM). These are just a few of China’s efforts to build an




The lethality and effectiveness of sea mining is often
overshadowed by the threats of torpedoes and anti-ship
cruise missiles. The placement of sea mines can be an
inexpensive way of controlling strategic points of access.
The mining, or suspected mining, of waters is an effective
form of sea-denial and may potentially disrupt an opposing
navy’s ability to operate in a particular area. Iraq’s use
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Enterprise Institute 1999, 71.
78 Godwin, 464-487.
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of sea mines during Operations Desert Storm and Desert
Shield is a successful example of their denial capability.
General Schwarzkopf recalled:
I’d canceled the Navy’s amphibious assault on Faylakah
Island. Plans called for it to precede the ground war by
two days, but the helicopter carrier U.S.S. Tripoli and the
Aegis guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Princeton had struck
mines, U.S. and British minesweepers had been unable to
clear the area, and as a result the Navy hadn’t made it
into position to launch the attack in time.79 
The PLAN is believed to maintain a large inventory of
sea-mines, mostly consisting of former Soviet-designed
naval mines of various types.80 Sea mines can be moored at
various depths, set adrift, buried on the sea floor, and
are often difficult to detect. The added convenience of
mining is that every vessel and aircraft in its naval
inventory is potentially a minelayer.81 Clearing them is
dangerous, time consuming, and never sure.

D. TRANSFORMATION
1. Revolution in Military Affairs
Some Chinese scholars refer to the information era, as
the third military revolution, which was preceded by the
1960s development of nuclear and guided missile technology
and before this the 1930s use of airplanes, tanks, and
                    
79 Petre, Peter. Schwarzkopf – It Doesn’t Take a Hero – The
Autobiography. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 446.
80 The Military Balance 1999-2000, 187.
81 See Appendixes F-I.
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radios on the battlefield.82 PRC writings indicate that the
U.S. is the model for military success. China’s observation
of the U.S. ability to exploit information warfare in the
past two decades has fueled China’s interest in a
revolution in military affairs (RMA). U.S. efforts have
shed light on how far behind, and in what direction,
China’s future modernization efforts need to advance. The
PRC began expediting its modernization process by procuring
weapons to counter Western technology. The Chinese have
identified and evaluated our strengths and weaknesses.
Their writings stress arms procurements, new tactics,
reorganization, and development of innovations and
technologies to counter US military superiority. Further
proof lies in their acquisitions of advanced air and naval
systems.83 
Although the PLAN is relatively large in its size,
compared to the operational potency of other navies within
the region, it lags behind. At this stage of Chinese naval
development, it is safe to assume that it is not prepared
to fight a fleet-on-fleet engagement against advanced
Western weaponry. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
(JMSDF), and the Republic of Korea (ROK), Taiwanese and
U.S. navies are powerful enough to successfully thwart a
PRC naval engagement. The PLAN is trying to overcome
potential adversaries strengths by incorporating emerging
doctrine with indigenous research and development, and
foreign acquisitions. The PRC is evaluating U.S. military
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capabilities and its performance during U.S. involvement in
Iraq and Kosovo. From these observations, the Chinese use
U.S. weaponry and its technological superiority as a
benchmark for furthering China’s potential towards its
RMA.84 The U.S. experience demonstrates the importance of
grasping and incorporating long-range strike, information,




Similar to the U.S. downsizing efforts beginning in
the late 1980’s, the Chinese have realized how costly it is
to pay for salaries, training, facilities, and maintenance
of men and material that are either underutilized or
unnecessary. The PLAN has undertaken efforts to reduce the
size of its manpower, to decommission older ships, and to
purge technologically obsolete equipment from its
inventory. The lesson that China appears to have learned
from the U.S. Navy is that quantity does not necessarily
equate to quality.
PLAN growth over the past decade has been modest,
adding an average of five naval vessels per year to their
inventory.86 The new vessels are a mixture of indigenously
produced and Russian designed vessels. China’s acquisition
of these technologies remains a surmounting obstacle for
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85 Chen, Huan. “The Third Military Revolution.” Contemporary
Military Affairs March 1996, 389.
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the PLAN. The problem with acquiring foreign technologies
is integrating them with indigenous systems, maintenance
and parts replacement, and of course, training personnel to
operate the systems. As long as the PRC continues to invest
in foreign technologies, the PLAN will struggle with
interoperability issues among its forces and platforms. 
 China has placed a greater emphasis upon the
professional development of its naval officers and enlisted
to help solve this problem. Military schools and academies
are being created and assuming a greater responsibility for
ensuring that personnel are properly trained to tactically
operate their equipment. The training and education of
naval personnel is imperative to maintaining high standards
of readiness. As the PLAN continues to modernize, it is
assumed that its tactics will constantly change as new
equipment is introduced. Presently, only about 30 percent
of PLAN officers are college graduates. These numbers are
expected to increase by about one percent per year as
partnerships with civilian universities begin producing
naval officers.87 The Chinese have also reduced their
military regions from eleven to seven, restored the
military rank system, and introduced new uniforms. These
are just a few of the attempts by the PRC to




The PLAN is a brown water navy, primarily operating in
the littoral areas to 100 nautical miles offshore. This is
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partly due to China’s traditional focus on the continental
rather than the maritime arena. “Navies were built and
employed almost entirely for defensive purposes.”88
Consequently, the PLAN had not received the funding nor had
the expertise to build vessels and supporting units in the
past to operate in a green or blue water environment.
Recently, PRC national security policymakers have realized
the importance of having a stronger and more modernized
PLAN in order to bolster national defense and support its
maritime interests. This is evidenced by the fact that the
PLAN receives as much as one-third of the PLA budget,
although it comprises no more than about 13 percent of the
two million PLA personnel.89 Interpreting China’s actual
defense spending from its official spending is a difficult
task. Many Chinese budget analysts agree that PRC defense
expenditures are greater than officially published figures.

4. Defense Industry
China’s naval modernization efforts are branching out
in many directions. China is restructuring its defense
industries and removing the PLA from commercial business
practices. State-owned enterprises (SOE) are being
privatized to improve quality, increase profits, and save
government dollars. The PRC is counting on these changes to
enhance the invention and manufacturing of advanced
indigenous technologies. All of these advancements, as well
as information warfare (IW), space, and nuclear
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developments will propel Chinese naval modernization and




This thesis presents a comprehensive analysis of
China’s naval modernization. The present direction and
scale of PLAN modernization is in part a reflection of its
perceived ambitions in the South China Sea. The PRC is
modernizing and expanding the PLAN for the stated purpose
of protecting China’s security, territorial integrity, and
economic interests around the world. Beijing’s concern
about China’s dependence on oil and natural gas from the
Middle East, actual and projected growth in the PRC’s
economy, and the potential oil and gas reserves in the
South China Sea are critical factors driving PLAN
expansion. Competing territorial claims for island groups
and potential oil, gas, and mineral rights further motivate
the PRC’s assertion that the South China Sea inherently
belongs to China.
China’s naval capabilities are improving and will
continue to extend further into its offshore perimeter as
the PLAN continues to modernize. But, China will not have a
blue water fleet by 2020. PLAN shipbuilding and foreign
acquisitions suggest that China is investing in platforms
that increase its ability to protect its interests in the
South China Sea, focusing on platforms capable of denying
access, controlling sea-lanes and chokepoints. China’s
increasing naval power has the potential of upsetting the
military balance of power in the Asia-Pacific and poses a
significant threat to U.S. presence as well as those
countries bordering China and the South China Sea. The PRC
has placed a great deal of emphasis on modernizing the PLAN
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since the early 1990’s. Specifically, purchasing Russian
conventional naval arms designed to defeat and counter U.S.
naval platforms. China’s motivation to purchase these
platforms supports its desire to protect and maintain its
maritime interests.
A future PLAN capable of successfully carrying out a
sea-denial strategy would enable China to maintain a
formidable presence in the South China Sea. As PLAN
capabilities increase, its enhanced strength will directly
affect China’s ability to enforce its interests and
eventually alter the balance of power in the region. The
United States needs to continue with diplomatic approaches
to China on issues of territoriality, sovereignty, and
trade in the South China Sea. Meanwhile it should support
cooperative ventures between the American and Chinese
navies, while continuing to maintain a viable naval
presence in the Asia-Pacific to counter China’s naval
expansion.
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APPENDIX B. SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
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APPENDIX C. COUNTRIES THAT OCCUPY THE SPRATLY
ISLANDS
Country              Islands Occupied           Troops

PRC                  7; several helo pads       260

Philippines          9; 1300-m runway           480

Vietnam              24; 600-m runway           600

Malaysia             3; 600-m runway            70

Taiwan               1; 1 helo pad                      
100

MAJOR GARRISONED ISLANDS IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
 
                                                            
Year Occupied

PRC: Fiery Cross (Yongshu Jiao) 1988

Philippines: (Thitu Pagasa) 1971

Vietnam: Spratly Island (Truong Sa Dong; Nanwei Dao) 1974

Malaysia: Swallow Reef (Terumbu Layang Layang) 1983

Taiwan: Itu Aba (Taiping) 1956

Source: Lin Cheng-yi’s “Security Implications” conference
paper. He cites the following as his sources: 1993-1994
National Defense Report, Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming
Cultural Enterprise Company, 1994), 43; and Allan Shephard,
“Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea and the
Neighborhood: Some Solutions,” Studies in Conflict and
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APPENDIX D. GROWTH IN MERCHANDISE EXPORTS OF ASIAN
COUNTRIES, 1990-2000 (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
  1990  1995  % Growth 
1990-1995  
2000  % Growth 
1990-2000  
China  62.1 148.8 140%  249.3 301% 
Hong Kong  82.4 173.9 111%  202.4 146% 
Indonesia  25.7 45.4 77%  62.1 142% 
Japan  287.6 443.1 54%  479.2 67% 
Korea, Rep. of  65.0 125.1 92%  172.3 165% 
Malaysia  29.4 73.9 151%  98.2 234% 
Philippines  8.1 17.5 116%  39.8 391% 
Singapore  52.8 118.3 124%  137.9 161% 
Taiwan  67.1 111.6 66%  148.3 121% 
Thailand  23.1 56.4 144%  69.1 199% 
Vietnam  2.4 5.4 125%  14.5 504% 
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APPENDIX E. GROWTH IN U.S. MERCHANDISE IMPORTS FROM
ASIA, 1990-2000 (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
   1990  1995  
% Growth  
1990-1995  2000  
% Growth 
1990-2000  
China  15.2 45.6 199% 100.1 557% 
Hong Kong  9.5 10.3 8% 11.5 21% 
Indonesia  3.3 7.4 122% 10.4 211% 
Japan  90.4 123.6 37% 146.6 62% 
Korea, Rep. of  18.5 24.2 31% 40.3 118% 
Malaysia  5.3 17.5 232% 25.6 385% 
Philippines  3.4 7.0 107% 13.9 312% 
Singapore  9.8 18.6 89% 19.2 95% 
Taiwan  22.7 29.0 28% 40.5 79% 
Thailand  5.3 11.4 114% 16.4 210% 
Vietnam  0.0 0.2 --- 0.8  --- 
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APPENDIX F. PRC SURFACE FORCE ASSETS
Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Sovremenny Destroyer     2(1) 2000-01 
Luhu (Type 052) Destroyer     2 1994-6 
Luda I/II (Type 051) Destroyer   15 1971-92 
Luda III Destroyer     1 1993 
Luhai Destroyer     1 1999 
Jianghu I (Type 053) Frigate   27 1970s-96 
Jianghu II (Type 053) Frigate     1 1984 
Jianghu III/IV (Type 053 
HT) 
Frigate     3 1986-93 
Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G) Frigate     4 1991-4 
Jiangwei II Frigate     6(+2) 1998- 
Houjian (Type 037/2, 
Huang) 
Fast Attack Craft - Missile     6(+1) 1991-9 
Houxin (Type 037/1G) Fast Attack Craft - Missile   26 1991- 
Huangfen (Type 021, Osa I) Fast Attack Craft - Missile   30 1985-95 
Houku Fast Attack Craft - Missile   25 n/a 
Hainan (Type 037) Fast Attack Craft - Patrol   95 1963-95 
Haiqing (Type 037/1) Fast Attack Craft - Patrol   22 1992- 
Huchuan (Type 025/026) Fast Attack Craft - Torpedo   15 1966-94 
Shanghai II (Type 062) Fast Attack Craft - Gun   98 1961-95 
Haijiu Large Patrol Craft     2 n/a 
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Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Haizhui/Shanghai III Coastal Patrol Craft   15(+2) n/a 
T 43 (Type 010) Minesweeper - Ocean   27(+13) 1966-80 
Wosao Minesweeper - Coastal     8(+1) 1988-95 
Futi (Type 312) Drone Minesweeper     4(+42) n/a 
Wolei Minelayer     1 1988 
Yuting (Type 074) Landing Ship Tank     8 1992-2000 
Yukan (Type 072) Landing Ship Tank     7 1980-95 
Yuliang (Type 079) Landing Ship Medium   22 1980- 
Yudeng (Type 073) Landing Ship Medium     1 1994 
Yudao Landing Ship Medium     1 1980s 
Yuhai (Wuhu-A) (Type 074) Landing Ship Medium   13(+3) 1995-7 
Yunnan (Type 067) Landing Craft Utility   36(+200) 1968-1982 
Yuch'in (Type 068/069) Landing Craft 
Utility/Personnel 
    8(+30) 1962-72 
Jingsah II Hovercraft   10 1979- 
Daxin Training Ship     1 1987 
Shichang Air Training Ship     1 1997 
Qiongsha Personnel Attack Transport     6 1980- 
Dazhi Submarine Support Ship     1 1963-5 
Dajiang Submarine Support Ship     3 1976 
Dadong Salvage Ship     1 1999 
Dadao Salvage Ship     1 1986 
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Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Dazhou Submarine Tender     2 1976-7 
Dalang Submarine Support Ship     4 1975-96 
Hudong Submarine Rescue Ship     1 1967 
Achelous Repair Ship     1 1947 
Dayun (Type 904) Cargo Ship     2 1992 
Andong Cargo Ship     1 n/a 
Galati Cargo Ship     1 1970s 
Yantai Cargo Ship     2 n/a 
Danlin Cargo Ship   13 1960-2 
Hongqi Cargo Ship     5 n/a 
Leizhou Cargo Ship     9 1960s 
Fuqing Replenishment Ship     2 1979 
Nanyun Replenishment Ship     1 1996 
Shengli Replenishment Ship     2 1970s 
Fuzhou Replenishment Ship     7 1996 
Fulin Replenishment Ship     8 1972- 
Dandao Coastal Tanker     3 1970s 
Guangzhou Coastal Tanker/Water 
Carrier 
    5 1970-80s 
Yen Pai Degaussing Vessel     3 n/a 
Dadie Intelligence Gathering 
Vessel 
    1 1986 
Yuan Wang 1-4 Space Event Ship     4 1979-1996 
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Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Shiyan Space Event Ship     1 2000 
Wuhu B Research Ship     2 1997 
Dahua Research Ship     1 1998 
Xiangyang Hong Research Ship   13 1970s 
Yanqian Research Ship     2 1980-1 
Dajiang Research Ship     2 1981-2 
Hai Ying Research Ship     2 1987-9 
Kan Research Ship     2 1985-7 
Xing Fengshan Research Ship     1 1987 
Hai Research Ship     1 1975 
Dong Fang Hong Research Ship     1 1966 
Hai Yang Research Ship     2 1972-4 
Shuguang 04 Research Ship     5 1970-5 
Shuguang (ex-T 43) Research/Survey Ship     1 1960s 
Ganzhu Research Ship     1 n/a 
Yenlai Survey Ship     5 1970s 
Yannan Survey Ship     4 1980 
Wuhu B Research Ship     2 1997 
Yanbing (modified Yanha) Icebreaker     1 1982 
Yanha Icebreaker     3 1969-89 

Source: Jane’s Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China
and Northeast Asia-12
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APPENDIX G. PRC SUBMARINE FORCE ASSETS
Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Xia (Type 092) SSBN     1 1987 
`Golf' SSB     1 1966 
Han SSN     5 1971-90 
Song (Type 039) SSK     3(1) 1999- 
Kilo (Type 877EKM) SSK     4 1995- 
`Ming' (Type 035) SS   17 1971- 
`Romeo' (Type 033) SS   32(2) 1962-87 
Modified `Romeo' SSG     1 n/a 
DSRV Salvage Submarine     1 n/a 
 
Key 
SSBN - Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine. 
SSB - Ballistic Missile Submarine. 
SSN - Nuclear Attack Submarine. 
SSK - Diesel-Electric Attack Submarine. 
SS - Attack Submarine. 
SSG - Guided Missile Submarine. 
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APPENDIX H. PRC NAVAL AIR FORCE FIXED-WING ASSETS
Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Xian H-6/H-6 III Bomber   30 n/a 
Harbin H-5 Bomber 100 1967 
Nanchang Q-5 Attack 100 n/a 
Shenyang J-6/JJ-6 Air Defense/Attack 250 n/a 
Chengdu/Guizhou J-7 
I/II/III 
Air Defense/Attack 100 1966-1992 
Shaanxi Y-8 Airborne Early Warning     6(1) n/a 
Harbin SH-5 Maritime Patrol     4 1986 
Beriev Be-6 `Madge' ASW Flying-Boat   12 n/a 
Xian Y-7 Transport   10 1984 
Shijiazhuang Y-5 Utility   40 n/a 
Shenyang J-5A Lead-In Trainer   50 1964 
 
Source: Jane’s Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China
and Northeast Asia-12
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APPENDIX I: PRC NAVAL AIR FORCE ROTARY-WING ASSETS 
Type Role Quantity Delivered 
Aerospatiale SA 321G/Zhi-8 
Super Frelon 
ASW Helicopter    6 1991 
Sud SA 321J Super 
Frelon/Changhe Z-8 
ASW Helicopter 8/12 1977-1994 
Harbin Zhi-9A ASW Helicopter    10 1989 
Kamov Ka-28 `Helix-A' ASW Helicopter    12(1) 1999 
 
Source: Jane’s Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China
and Northeast Asia-12
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APPENDIX J: PRC NAVAL-MARINE INFANTRY ASSETS
Type Role Quantity 
Type 59 Main Battle Tank 400 
Type 60 Light Tank 250 
Type 63 Light Tank 100 
PT-76 Light Tank 250 
Type 531 Armored Personnel Carrier 500 
Type 77 Armored Personnel Carrier 180 
122 mm Type 54 Howitzer 100 
122 mm Type 54-I Self-Propelled Howitzer 200 
Type 63 Multiple Rocket Launcher n/a 
Source: Jane’s Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China
and Northeast Asia-12
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APPENDIX K: PRC COASTAL REGIONAL DEFENSE ASSETS
Type Role Quantity 
C-201 Hai Ying Missile System n/a 
C-101 Hai Ying 2 Missile System n/a 
130 mm Coastal Artillery 250 
100 mm Coastal Artillery 500 
85 mm Coastal Artillery 500 

Source: Jane’s Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China
and Northeast Asia-12
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APPENDIX L: PRC NAVAL AIR DEFENSE ASSETS
Type Role 
CATIC PL-2 Atoll' Air-to-air 
CPMIEC YJ-G (CAS-1 `Kraken' Anti-ship Attack 

Source: Jane’s Defense Sentinel Security Assessment-China
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